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Reinforcement learning models now provide principled guides for
a wide range of reward learning experiments in animals and
humans. One key learning (error) signal in these models is expe-
riential and reports ongoing temporal differences between ex-
pected and experienced reward. However, these same abstract
learning models also accommodate the existence of another class
of learning signal that takes the form of a fictive error encoding
ongoing differences between experienced returns and returns that
‘‘could-have-been-experienced’’ if decisions had been different.
These observations suggest the hypothesis that, for all real-world
learning tasks, one should expect the presence of both experiential
and fictive learning signals. Motivated by this possibility, we used
a sequential investment game and fMRI to probe ongoing brain
responses to both experiential and fictive learning signals gener-
ated throughout the game. Using a large cohort of subjects (n 
54), we report that fictive learning signals strongly predict changes
in subjects’ investment behavior and correlate with fMRI signals
measured in dopaminoceptive structures known to be involved in
valuation and choice.
counterfactual signals  decision-making  neuroeconomics 
reinforcement learning
Neuroimaging experiments have begun to identify dynamicneural responses related to economic instincts including
risk, gains, losses, and errors in reward expectations (1–8). Using
interpersonal economic exchanges with humans and computers,
even fairness, deviations from fairness, and revenge responses
have produced an array of consistent neural correlates (9–12).
Using event-related fMRI and a sequential investment game, we
probe a formerly underappreciated signal type, a fictive learning
error, predicted by a natural extension of a reinforcement
learning model called Q-learning (13, 14). These signals are an
augmentation to reinforcement learningmodels now used widely
to design and interpret neuroimaging experiments in a range of
reward-learning and economic decision-making tasks (Fig. 1A)
(for a review, see ref. 15). We begin by introducing fictive
learning signals in relation to reward error models based on
experience, identify their connection to an older model of
regret-based choice, and justify the elements of our sequential
decision-making game given to human subjects.
Experiments examining the neural basis of valuation have
identified midbrain dopaminergic systems as central players for
reward processing and for the valuations that underlie reward
processing and reward-guided choice (1–8, 16–22). This work
associates transient modulations in the activity of midbrain
dopamine neurons with reward prediction error signals (3–7,
16–18), and has equated reward prediction errors with the
temporal difference (TD) error term that guides learning and
action choice in actor-critic models (6, 15).
One formulation of this model, called Q-learning, depicts the
TD error term t as
t ra  max
a˜
QSt1, a˜  QSt, a ,
where r(a) is the reward obtained for choosing action a, Q(St, a)




is the maximum of the Q values over all actions available from
state St, and  is a discount factor (Fig. 1A) (13, 14). It is this
error signal that guides the learning of the value of states and
actions based on actions actually taken (23). The general idea is
illustrated in Fig. 1A. The animal is in a state St at time t, chooses
some action to leave the state, ends up in a new state St1 at time
t  1, and observes some reward r that depends on the action
chosen. At such transitions, the TD error can inform the system
about which output states, and consequently which actions,
should yield the best average long-term returns. This framework
has now been used extensively to understand a wide range of
reward processing and valuation experiments in humans (15, 20).
Reinforcement learning models like the Q-learning model
above focus on updating stored internal values based solely on
the direct experience of the learner as indicated in Fig. 1A (solid
arrow); however, once an action is taken, it is often the case that
information becomes available that shows that another action
(among those not taken; dashed arrow) would have been more
valuable. It is these ‘‘could have been’’ actions that provide extra
criticism for updating the values of states and actions (i.e., the Q
values); and just like the reward prediction errors associated with
actual experience, there should be analogous learning signals
associated with the actions not taken: fictive learning signals.
In this article, we use a sequential gambling task that probes
the ongoing difference between ‘‘what could have been ac-
quired’’ and ‘‘what was acquired.’’ Fig. 1B shows the outline of
events in the task. At time t, the player makes a new investment
allocation (bet) by moving a centrally placed slider bar to the new
bet, and at time t  1, the next snippet of market information is
displayed (Fig. 1B). Two outcomes are possible at that moment:
(i) the market goes up and all bets higher than the bet placed are
better because they would have accrued greater gains or (ii) the
market goes down and all bets lower than the bet placed are
better because they all would have accrued smaller losses.
At each decision point, bets can be set anywhere from 0% to
100% in increments of 10%. Each player plays 10 different
markets and makes 20 decisions per market arranged at regular
intervals as depicted in Fig. 1B. Fig. 1B displays the important
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design features of the game to clarify when the fictive error signal
is expected to change; the exact visual arrangement is shown in
Fig. 2A, and a time-line is shown in Fig. 2B. After each choice,
the natural learning signal for criticizing the choice (the bet) is
the difference between the best return that ‘‘could have been’’
obtained and the actual return, that is, the fictive error signal.
We now define the fictive error signal in this task and note here
that it is strongly related to a term in the ‘‘regret-based’’ theory
of decision-making under uncertainty proposed by Bell, Loomes,
and Sugden in 1982 (24, 25). We avoid calling the signal regret
because this term has a much broader, multidimensional mean-
ing than we imply by fictive error (26).
Let the fractional change in the market (price) at time t be rt,
and let the concurrent time series of bets be bt. At each time t,
the amount gained due to the subject’s choice is bt  rt
 for positive
fractional changes in themarket rt
, that is, rt
 (pt pt1)/(pt)
0, where pt is the market price at time t. The amount lost is bt 
rt
 for similarly defined negative fractional changes in the market
rt
. After a decision, we take the fictive error to be the difference
between the best outcome that could have been achieved and the
actual gain or loss. After an ‘‘experiential’’ gain, the fictive error
is ft
  1  rt
  bt  rt
; the best bet would have been 100%, i.e.,
all invested. After an ‘‘experiential’’ loss, the associated fictive
error is ft
  0  rt
  bt  rt
; the best bet would have been 0%,
i.e., all ‘‘cashed out.’’
Results
Fifty-four healthy subjects (31 male, 23 female; ages 19–54) were
scanned while performing the investment task outlined in Fig. 1B
and Fig. 2. All players were initially endowed with $100. Each
subject played 20 markets and made 20 decisions per market.
The markets were presented in one of two conditions: (i) ‘‘Live,’’
where the subject made money, and (ii) a condition called ‘‘Not
Live,’’ which controlled for visuomotor aspects of the task. Half
the markets were played live and half not live, and these
conditions occurred in a randomized order for each subject. For
all markets used in this task, the price histories were taken from
actual historical markets [see supporting information (SI) Fig. 7
and SI Data Set for market details].
To determine the impact of the fictive error ( ft
  1  rt
  bt
 rt
) on the subjects’ behavior, we performed multiple regression
analysis on the behavioral data and found that the fictive error
over gains emerges quite naturally as an important behavioral
signal determining the next bet. We regressed the next bet bt1
against the previous bet bt, the previous market broken up into
positive and negative parts (rt
 and rt
, respectively), and the




bt1 c0 c1bt c2rt
 c3rt
 c4bt  rt c5bt  rt.
The results of this multiple regression are shown in Table 1 (see
SI Table 2 for an alternative regression, SI Data Set for statistics
on subjects’ performance, and SI Appendix for experience-
related and reaction time data). The only term that does not
emerge with a significant effect on the next bet is loss bt  rt
.
Not surprisingly, the three first-order terms (bt, rt
, and rt
)
significantly predict the next bet bt1: the last bet bt, positive
changes in the market rt
, and negative changes in the market rt
.
These effects are modulated by a negative contribution from bt
 rt
 (gain).
Fig. 1. Schematic of the idea of a fictive error and task design. (A) At time t,
an agent in state St transitions to a new state St1 by taking action at and
observes a reward rt. However, the agent also observes other rewards rt that
could have been received had alternative actions at been chosen. (B) The
figure under time t 1 shows the state of the task immediately after a snippet
of market has been revealed. At time t the subject makes a new allocation
between cash and stock (in this case increasing the bet). When the market goes
up, bigger investments are immediately revealed as better choices, generating
the fictive error ‘‘best choice  actual choice.’’ Likewise for market drops,
smaller investments would have been better.
Fig. 2. Experiment screen and time line. (A) Screen like that seen by subject
(the background was dark in the scanner). The subject has just lost 23.92%
(right box), has a portfolio worth $139 (left box), has 50% invested in the
market (middle bar), and has nine choices remaining (from examining the
screen). (B) Time-line of experiment. After the market outcome is revealed,
the middle bar (which indicates the bet size) is grayed out, and a new bet
cannot be submitted. The bar is illuminated 750 ms later, and the subject has
a free response period to submit a new bet. After the new bet is submitted, the
next snippet of market is revealed 750 ms later. The major regressors (includ-
ing the fictive error) used in the fMRI analysis are time-locked to this event.
Table 1. Behavioral regression
Coefficient Estimate SE t value p value
c 0.026 0.013 2.11 0.023
b˜t 0.582 0.031 18.9 0.000
rt
 5.56 0.651 8.54 0.000
rt
 3.76 0.529 7.09 0.000
bt  rt
 2.91 1.16 2.51 0.006
bt  rt
 1.55 1.23 1.26 0.105
Results of linear multiple regression of b˜t1, normalized next bet,
on indicated variables: b˜t is normalized previous bet, rt
 max(rt, 0), where rt
is the previous market return, rt
  max(r, 0), and bt is the unnormalized
previous bet. bt  rt
 is the actual investor return for the positive market case,
and similarly for bt  rt
. Random effects over subjects, n  54.
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Consequently, the multiple regression results show that the
next bet can be explained by a weighted sum of (i) the last market
(positive and negative) and (ii) a term proportional to (rt
  bt
 rt
), which is exactly the fictive error over gains ft
  1  rt
 
bt  rt
, as defined previously. This influence of the fictive error
on the next bet is depicted graphically in Fig. 3 for small,
medium, and large values of the fictive error (see SI Fig. 8 for
scatterplot).
These behavioral findings were paralleled by strong hemody-
namic responses for these same variables. We found clear neural
correlates for the influence of the market, experiential errors,
and fictive errors by using these quantities to construct regressors
that modulate a standard hemodynamic response time-locked to
the market reveal events (seeMethods for complete listing of the
regressors used). We present first the results for the fictive error
ft
 regression (Fig. 4). In the live condition, significant activation
is seen for the ft
 regressor in ventral caudate, ventral putamen,
and posterior parietal cortex (PPC) (see SI Appendix for acti-
vation tables). No significant activation is seen either in the
striatum or PPC in the not live case for the analogous regressor
rNL
 , showing that the activity in the striatum and PPC is not
related to the visual display (the activation for rt
 is not central
to our argument, but see SI Fig. 9).
TD errors in decision-making tasks have been studied in
depth, and fMRI studies have consistently shown TD error
activation in striatum (3–7, 15, 20). We thus focus here on the
striatal activation and whether we can separate striatal responses
due to TD errors (experiential errors) from those due to fictive
errors. In this investment game there are several forms that a TD
error might take. We used the TD error signal generated by the
difference of the investor return and investment size (reward 
expected reward). This regressor is a model-free version of a TD
signal where the bet is taken as the proxy for expected reward.
To address colinearity issues, we simultaneously included the TD
error and the orthogonalized fictive error signal in the model
with both regressors time-locked to the moment when the new
market value was revealed. Fig. 5 shows that the fictive error
signal produces responses in the ventral caudate not explained by
the TD error signal, as well as a significant response in bilateral
PPC. The finding in the dorsal striatum agrees with previous
work showing activation in the dorsal striatum in instrumental
conditioning tasks (6, 27, 28). The fictive error strongly influ-
ences the next bet and the associated brain response in the dorsal
striatum is consistent with this prior work dissociating TD errors
in passive tasks (ventral striatum) from those in active, instru-
mental tasks (dorsal striatum) (6).
To further substantiate our behavioral findings in the multiple
regression analysis above, we fit a Q-learning model to the
behavioral data using a tabular representation of states and
actions (see Methods for details). This analysis augments the
multiple regression analysis by framing the sequential decision
task as a learning problem and not merely a series of decisions
explained by a set of reasonable variables. Fig. 6 displays the
thresholded t-maps of the TD error from the Q-learning model
and the orthogonalized fictive error signal. These behavioral and
neural results support the conclusion that the fictive error signal
over gains ft
  1  bt  bt  rt
 significantly modulates investor
Fig. 3. Influence of fictive error signal on behavior. Barplot of the average
normalized change in next investment versus the level of the fictive error.
Changes in investment were converted into z-scores within each subject. The
fictive error signal was binned into three levels [(0.00, 0.04), (0.04, 0.08), (0.08,
)] for the figure (see SI Fig. 8 for a scatterplot). Error bars are standard errors.
Fig. 4. Brain responses to fictive error signal. (Upper) SPM t-statistic map for
the fictive error regressor ( ft
) showing activation in motor strip (a), inferior
frontal gyrus (b), caudate and putamen (c), and PPC (d). Threshold: p 	 1 

105 (uncorrected); cluster size 5. Slices defined by y  8 and y  72.
Random effects over subjects, n  54. (Lower) SPM t-statistic map for the
positive market return (rNL
 ) regressor in the ‘‘Not Live’’ condition showing no
activation in the striatum but strong activation in the visual cortex (e). Thresh-
old: p	 1
 105 (uncorrected); cluster size5. Slices defined by y 8 and y
72. Random effects over subjects, n  54.
Fig. 5. Basic TD regressor and fictive error signal. SPM t-statistic maps of the
basic TD regressor (Upper) and the fictive error signal (Lower) showing acti-
vation in the striatum associated with each. The fictive error regressor is
orthogonalized with respect to the TD regressor. Threshold: p 	 1 
 105
(uncorrected); cluster size 5. Random effects over subjects, n  54. (Insets)
Separate colored-coded activations for fictive error only, TD error only, and
the overlap region of the two. These activations are shown at three levels of
significance and suggest that activations to fictive error only may be segre-
gated to the ventral caudate.



















behavior and has a robust neural correlate in the ventral caudate
that is distinguishable from a standard experiential (TD) error.
Discussion
Our analysis shows that the fictive error signal ft
 is an important
determinant of choice behavior in a sequential decision-making
game and has a clear neural correlate in the ventral caudate.
Learning signals based on experiential rewards mediated by the
dopamine system have been studied extensively (3–7, 16–18, 21,
22, 29, 30). The experiential rewards that activate these circuits
range from primary rewards, to money, to more abstract con-
structs such as trust and revenge (11, 12). From these results it
is clear that abstract concepts of reward can harness the dopa-
mine system. The fictive error differs in that it involves rewards
not received from actions not taken. From a biological perspec-
tive, this generalization is compelling: more information is
preferable to less, assuming that the cost of getting and storing
the information is not too high.
Our fictive error signal is regret operationalized as in Bell,
Loomes, and Sugden (24, 25). These authors developed a theory
of choice that formalized the impact of the emotion of regret by
adding a term to the standard von Neumann–Savage expected
utility theory (EUT) that explicitly quantified the comparison of
the outcomes obtained to outcomes foregone. Loomes, Sugden,
and Bell’s theory accounts for many of the anomalies described
earlier by the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (30). A
large psychological literature chronicles the impact of counter-
factuals, specifically regret, as well as emotions on choice (26, 32,
33). We stress that the signal described above may or may not
have anything to do with the feeling of regret and that our
definition of a fictive error signal is defined as a function of two
measurable quantities and is correlated with a (possibly covert,
i.e., unconscious) signal in the brain.
Related concepts such as counterfactuals and regret have
been studied behaviorally and in fMRI experiments (1, 8,
34–36). Breiter et al. (1) report activity related to counterfactual
processing (disappointment) in a passive gambling task. Camille
et al. (34) report on the lack of the influence of regret in
orbitofrontal patients in a two-choice gambling game. Coricelli
et al. (35) use a similar two-choice paradigm in normal subjects
in an fMRI study and report activity in the orbitofrontal cortex
associated with regret. Kuhnen and Knutson (8) use a three-
choice task and report activity correlated with the difference
between the obtained outcome and the outcome of the other
risky choice in bilateral caudate. Camerer and Ho (36) use
knowledge of rewards from actions not taken in their EWA
(experience weighted attractions) model. In this model, actions
are taken according to probabilities that depend on attractions
that are updated after choices are made. The attractions are
updated by adding a fraction of the reward that was received (in
the case of the chosen action) or could have been received (in the
case of the actions not taken). EWA has been successful in
modeling behavior in a multitude of games from experimental
economics (36, 37). Although EWA uses counterfactual infor-
mation to update attractions, it does not explicitly include a term
comparing the foregone reward with the actual reward.
Our result also adds to the evidence pointing to a special role
for the caudate in decision-making in trial-and-error tasks
involving a diverse range of rewards, even including rewards
associated with social exchange (6, 11, 27, 28). Broadly, these
previous studies have reported caudate activation related to the
presentation of cues and receipt of reward in instrumental tasks.
Indeed, in O’Doherty et al. (6) there was no activation in the
caudate in the purely passive condition, providing evidence for
a dorsal/ventral dissociation between actor and critic. The fictive
error can be related to an extended version of the actor–critic
architecture introduced by Rosenstein and Barto (38), who
combine reinforcement and supervised learning in the actor’s
error signal in the actor–critic structure. We interpret the fictive
error as the report of an ‘‘endogenous supervisor.’’ More
formally (following ref. 38 closely), if we denote the actor’s policy
bya(), where  is a vector of parameters, then the actor’s policy
parameter update is given by
4   kRL 1 kSL.
Here, k  [0,1] is a parameter that measures the relative weight
of the reinforcement versus supervised aspects of learning, RL
is the standard reinforcement learning update, and SL is the
supervised learning error term that can be related to the fictive
error (see SI Appendix) by using steepest descent:
SL r1 aA A raA A.
The first term on the right is the fictive error of this article, and
the second term is identical to loss, because ‘‘shorting’’ (negative
bets) was not allowed.
Redish (39) captures (stylistically) several interesting aspects
of cocaine addiction using a maneuver related to the ‘‘endoge-
nous supervisor.’’ He adds a term to the TD update equation for
the critic that models the synaptic dopamine concentration
increase caused by cocaine. It is intriguing to speculate that
fictive error signals in the actor might have similar effects and
underlie components of compulsive gambling (40).
While we focused on the striatal activation in this work, the
activation in PPC associated with the fictive error signal overlaps
the activations in humans associated with delayed saccades in
PPC (identified as intraparietal sulcus 2, IPS2) found in
Schluppeck et al. (41). The homologous area of PPC in non-
human primates, LIP, has been implicated in decision-making
(42–44). The IPS2 activation in our task was not present in the
not live visual control condition, suggesting that IPS2 may play
a role in humans similar to that of LIP in non-human primates.
There is now ample evidence for experiential signals encoded
by the dopamine system in the form of TD errors. In this article,
we have shown evidence for a type of signal, a fictive error signal,
that, in our experiment, drives choice behavior and has a neural
correlate in the ventral caudate. It seems likely that situating
Fig. 6. Q-learning TD regressor and fictive error signal. SPM2 t-maps of the
Q-learning TD regressor (Upper) and the fictive error signal (Lower) again
showing activation in the ventral striatum associated with the TD error, and in
the ventral caudate for the fictive error. The fictive error regressor is orthogo-
nalized with respect to the TD regressor. Threshold: p 	 1 
 105 (uncor-
rected); cluster size5. Random effects over subjects,n 54. (Insets) Separate
colored-coded activations for fictive error only, TD error only, and the overlap
region of the two. The area of overlap is larger for the Q-learning model and
fictive error than for the TD regressor and fictive error (see Fig. 5).
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fictive error signals within the framework of machine learning
models will provide additional insight into normal human be-
havior as well as into diseases of decision-making.
Methods
Task Description. Subjects were scanned in accordance with a
protocol approved by the Baylor College of Medicine institutional
review board. Exclusion criteria were claustrophobia, DSM-IV
Axis I or II diagnosis, pregnancy, medications other than contra-
ceptives, contraindications to MRI (metal objects in body), active
medical or neurological disorder, and history of alcohol or drug
dependence. The subjects were between 19 and 54 years old (31
males, 23 females). One recruited subject started the scanning but
did not finish. After being read the task instructions (SI Text), the
subjects were placed into the scanner (Allegra 3T; Siemens) and
performed the following task. Two conditions, ‘‘Live’’ and ‘‘Not
Live,’’ alternated, with the ‘‘Not Live’’ condition appearing first.
During the ‘‘Live’’ condition, subjects made investment decisions,
and in the ‘‘Not Live’’ condition, they made visual discriminations.
In both conditions, price histories of actual historical market prices
were shown to the subjects (Market data: weekly closing prices from
EconStats; see SI Fig. 7 and SI Data Set for market graphs and
summary statistics). At the beginning of a ‘‘Live’’ block, an initial
10-unit segment of price history was presented. Each unit repre-
sented four actual weeks of price history. The visual display
represented each unit by the four weekly price points. The prices
were normalized to 100, so that the initial price was 100. A subject
then used a button box activated by one hand to move a slider bar
depicted on the screen to indicate her percentage allocation to the
market. At 0%, none of the initial $100 endowment would be
allocated to the market; at 100%, all would be subject to market
fluctuations. The slider moved in increments of 10%. After decid-
ing her allocation, the subject used a button box activated by her
other hand to submit the decision using another button box. The
hand assignments were balanced over subjects. After a delay of 750
ms, the next unit of price history appeared on the screen (the
previous history remained displayed, but the history was recentered
to prevent telegraphing unintended information about themarket),
the portfolio value was updated, and the percentage profit/loss was
displayed. After a delay of 750 ms, the slider bar changed from gray
to red, indicating the free response time for the portfolio allocation
decision (Fig. 2B). The process then repeated. Note that subjects’
portfolios were automatically rebalanced after each return to retain
the previously selected asset allocation. Additionally, this allocation
was displayed on the slider bar before the next decision, for a total
of 20 allocation decisions per round.At the end of the ‘‘Live’’ round,
the screen briefly disappeared, and a screen displaying ‘‘Not Live’’
announced the beginning of the ‘‘Not Live’’ condition. During this
condition the screen and events were similar in appearance, but a
visual discrimination decision was made rather than an asset
allocation decision: the subject used the same slider bar to answer
whether the current price was higher or lower than the price
two-segments previous. This was also repeated for 20 choices. Each
subject saw a grand total of 10 ‘‘Live’’ and 10 ‘‘Not Live’’ markets.
The 20 historical markets were divided into two groups of similar
characteristics. Subjects were approximately balanced (26 for group
A, 28 for group B) across the two groups of markets for the ‘‘Live’’
condition; the order of the markets for any particular subject was
random.
Image Acquisition and Preprocessing.High-resolution T1-weighted
scans were acquired by using an MPRage sequence (Siemens).
Functional run details: echo-planar imaging, gradient recalled
echo; repetition time (TR) 2,000 ms; echo time (TE) 40 ms;
flip angle  90°; 64 
 64 matrix, 26 4-mm axial slices, yielding
functional 3.4 mm 
 3.4 mm 
 4.0 mm voxels. Preprocessing of
functional imaging data was performed with SPM2 (Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience). Motion correction to the
first functional scan was performed by using a six-parameter
rigid-body transformation (45). The average of the motion-
corrected images was coregistered to each individual’s structural
MRI by using a 12-parameter affine transformation. Slice timing
artifact was corrected, after which images were spatially nor-
malized to the MNI template (46) by applying a 12-parameter
affine transformation, followed by a nonlinear warping using
basis functions (47). Images were then smoothed with an 8-mm
isotropic Gaussian kernel and high-pass-filtered in the temporal
domain (filter width 128 sec).
Statistical Analyses. Behavioral analysis and definitions. The time
series of investments and market returns were extracted for each
subject. The subjects’ investments were z-normalized within
subject. The following multivariate regression was then per-
formed in R (The R Foundation for Statistical Computing;
function lme, random effects over subjects, n  54):
b˜
t1
 	0 	1b˜t 	2rt
 	3rt
 	4bt  rt
 	5bt  rt
.
Here, b˜t is the within-subject z-scored bet. The other terms have
been defined in the main text. The initial reveal, first reveal, and
final reveal data were excluded from the regression because for
the initial reveal there is no preceding investment decision, for
the first reveal the investment decision was in a different context
(i.e., no previous investment), and for the final reveal there is no
immediately following investment decision. The results are
shown in Table 1.
General linear model analysis. Visual stimuli and motor responses
(see SI Appendix for complete list of regressors) were entered in
a general linear model (48) as separate regressors constructed by
convolving punctate events at the onset of each stimulus or
motor response with the fixed hemodynamic response function
implemented within SPM2. Additional regressors were con-
structed from the markets or from behavioral data. For example,
the fictive error regressor was formed by multiplying (point-wise
in time) the live reveal (punctuate) regressor by rt
(1  bt). The
basic TD regressor was constructed as follows. At live reveal t,
the z-normalized subject return was defined as r˜t  (rt 
mean(r))/(stdev(r)), where the mean and standard deviation is
taken over the subject returns already experienced. The subject’s
z-normalized investment b˜t was defined similarly. The basic TD
regressor was then defined as TDt r˜t b˜t. As in the case of the
behavioral data, the initial and first reveal data and the final l
reveal data were omitted from the regressors. Orthogonalization
of the fictive error regressor with respect to the TD error
regressor was accomplished by subtracting the orthogonal pro-
jection of the fictive error onto the TD error from the fictive
error regressor. SPM2 betamaps were constructed for regressors
of interest and then entered into a random-effects analysis by
using the one sample t test function.
Dynamic Choice Models: Q-Learning. A Q-learning model (13, 14)
was estimated by using a tabular representation of the state
space and actions. The state space  was taken to be a product
of a discrete representation of the last market return (6
categories: (100, 0.05], (0.05, 0.025], (0.025, 0], (0,
0.025], (0.025, 0.05], (0.05, 100]), and the previous investment
(11 categories). The space of actions A was taken to be the set
of possible investments (0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.8, 0.9, 1). The reward
R after making an investment 
 was 
 
 r, where r was the
market return. The Q values were updated according to
QSt, a4 QSt, a c1TD,



















TD R  max
a˜
QSt1, a˜  QSt, a .
Here,   0.99 is the discount parameter, and c1 is the learning
rate (this TD was used for the regressor mentioned in above).
The choice probabilities were then obtained from the Q values
by the Boltzmann distribution
PSt, a
e	QSt,ae	QSt,b ,
where 	  1/T is the inverse temperature, which measures how
concentrated the distribution is about the maximal Q value. The
initial Q values were all taken to be zero, and the likelihood of
each subject’s choices was maximized over the learning rate and
temperature by subject.
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